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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the signing of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) can be ex-
plained by its dierential impact on welfare and the distributive consequences of regulating and
enforcing investment standards at the international level. We develop a model that formalizes
the logic prevalent in the extant literature on the political economy of BITs. Following that
literature we assume that governments compete for a (xed) supply of domestic and foreign in-
vestment; we also assume that investors care about the expected return from their investment;
and that investing abroad involves higher costs and risks than at home. Investors' decisions
are thus the outcome of a mean-variance optimization problem that explicitly accounts for this
home country bias. The interaction between governments is modeled as a network formation
process where nodes (countries) choose which arcs to add (treaties to sign). We explicitly model
the main provisions of BITs as an enforcement technology that has the potential to reduce costs
and risk of investing in the signatory parties; we also model BITs potential to increase the re-
turn to investors, as discussed in the literature. In deciding which treaties to sign, governments
internalize the potential eects of inward investment on the return to domestic factors of pro-
duction. A central corollary derived from our model is that eect of BITs should be reected
on the mean and/or the variance of the return to investment. However, in equilibrium -when
all the potentially benecial agreements have been signed and the network reaches a level of
saturation- the signing and ratication of BITs would be consistent with a limited reallocation of
investment capital across countries, or even no reallocation at all if BIT signing is defensive. We
would expect temporary changes in the allocation of capital in favor of countries that are BIT
signatories in the transition to that stage, a prediction that seems to be borne out in statistical
analyses of US outward FDI. Yet the model suggests that in equilibrium BITs should have an
eect on the risk faced by investors, and on their returns in the specic locations, outcomes that
are hard to observe. Hence we develop an empirical strategy to estimate the eect of BITs on
risk. Our model and preliminary empirical ndings help explain the contradictory results in the
empirical literature on the eects of BITs on FDI ows.
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Why do countries sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs)? Following a profuse literature on the
subject we argue that governments are driven by the expected impact of treaties on the return and
risk faced by their nationals when engaging in direct investment abroad. Historically the provisions
governing foreign investment emanated from customary law or from investment provisions added
as ancillary documents to trade agreements, such as the provisions under chapter 4 of Title III of
the Treaty of Rome, or NAFTA's Chapter 11. Yet most of the international agreements to date
take the form of BITs. According to UNCTAD, at the end of 2008 the cumulative number of BITs
signed was 2,676.1 Most BITs involve a developed country, usually the source of direct investment,
and a developing country.2 In recent years, however, the number of investment agreements between
developing countries is increasing.3
Investment agreements have provisions regarding admission and conditions for investment, grant
national treatment, and establish arbitration mechanisms (Sauvant & Sachs 2009; UNCTAD 2009).
Investor protection is thus a central feature of these agreements.4 Over the past decade there has
been a dramatic increase in the number of BITs signed, while most multilateral initiatives failed
(Kobrin 1998). Studies aimed at identifying the correlates and determinants of BIT signing present
contradictory conclusions, and there is a big controversy about their eects (Rose-Ackerman &
Tobin 2005; Neumeyer & Spess 2005; Elkins et al. 2006; Jandhyala et al. 2008; Buthe & Milner
2008, 2009; UNCTAD 1998, 2009). In the end there is a growing consensus that the impact of
BITs is not sizable, and there is \that host-country market-size variables remain the dominant
factor for inward FDI" (UNCTAD 2009, pp. xiii). This limited impact of BITs on investment ows
contrasts with the proliferation of bilateral investment agreements in recent years. If BITs have
limited eect, why sign them?
1http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf
2The most active BIT signatory party is Germany with 135 agreements signed, followed by China (119), Switzer-
land (114), the United Kingdom (103), Egypt (100), Italy (100), France (98), the Netherlands (91), Korea (86) and
the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (84). See UNCTAD 2009; Sachs and Sauvant 2009, pp. xxxv.
3This may coincide with some emerging markets becoming a source of direct investment: according to UNCTAD
2007, emerging markets account for about one fourth of the world's FDI stock under BITs (Sachs and Sauvant 2009,
pp. xxxiv-xxxv). Yet there are also many instances of unlikely partners signing BITs; see Jandhyala et al. 2008.
4In recent years the US and Canadian model BITs go beyond investor protection, requiring specic eorts at
liberalizing investment regimes as well.
2This paper aims at reconciling the contradictory results of BITs on investment activities and
the proliferation of investment agreements. We bring forth the main economic properties of BITs
to develop a formal model of the investment protection network. Our model is built on specic
assumptions about the impact of BITs that motivate the extant empirical literature on the political
economy of FDI. Namely, whether BITs liberalize investment environment, thus increasing the
return of investing in a host country, or reduce risk of investing abroad by allowing investors to
resort to international arbitration. To the extent that these are the main properties of bilateral
investment agreements their eect would be reected in increasing returns to investors and lowering
the risk of investing in a host country. If governments are predisposed to sign BITs in response
to competitive pressures created by the quest for foreign investment|as assumed in the literature
and supported by empirical evidence|in the long run we should expect to see a drop in risk and
possible an increase in the return to FDI.5
However, in the long-run we would not observe a change in the allocation of direct investment
when all `potentially benecial' BITs have been signed, i.e.: when the BIT network approaches
its stage of saturation.6 We could expect some transitional changes in the allocation of capital in
favor of countries that are BIT signatories in the transition to that stage. If riskier countries are
more likely to sign BITs, the eect will be more pronounced within countries over time. These
predictions seem to be borne out in preliminary tests using outward direct investment data for
the United States from 1970-2006. By modeling the properties of the possible agreements, and
the strategic interaction among investors, home and host governments, we are able to explain the
absence of a clear association between BITs and the allocation of investment across countries in the
empirical literature. Moreover, our analysis suggest that there is no positive association between the
income reported by US MNCs and being under an active BIT. But we do nd a positive correlation
between BITs and investment risk indices, a coarse proxy of the variance of the return in line with
5See Guinsburg 2007, pp. 117. An alternative explanation, which our model does not speak to, is one based on
signaling. It is not at all apparent what signing BITs is really signaling. If trustworthy, is there a need to sign? Can
we think about the existence of pooling equilibria?
6The proliferation of BITs has resulted a network that is small and dense which is rapidly approaching its saturation
level. Since the late 1990s, for instance, the number of countries (nodes) joining the network and the number of treaties
(arcs) signed has decreased. This should not be a surprise: 178 countries have signed at least one BIT by 2005 (out
of roughly 200 sovereign units in the world). See Bonomo et al. 2010, pp. 3662; 3665-6.
3the expectations of the eects of the provisions of the bilateral investment regime.
Yet the evidence from the econometric exercise is only an indirect test of the main prediction
derived from our model that the eect of BITs should be reected in risk levels in host countries.
In order to test this predictions more directly we develop an empirical strategy aimed at estimating
the risk of foreign direct investment with and without BITs for dierent groups of countries. We
start from the assumptions of our model that the decision of foreign investors on where to operate
is analogous to a portfolio allocation decision. We use this data to compute a least square estimator
of the rst two moments of the distribution of returns, taking into account whether the country of
origin signed a BIT with the receiving country, and the development level of the latter.7 In future
work we will use parameters from this structural model to simulate the pattern of the proliferation
of BITs in recent years.
The corollary from our exercise that is that formalizing the properties of Bilateral Investment
treaties allows for a better understanding of the motivations to sign them and their expected
consequences. The contradictory and inconclusive results on the eects of BITs on investment
reported in the empirical literature are consistent with a model where BITs are consequential. The
relevant empirical implication of the formation of the BITs network is a convergence in the level
of risk and return in countries that participate in the network, which requires moving beyond the
analysis of investment stocks and ows.
2 Summary of Empirical Literature on BITs
Empirical analyses aimed at identifying the correlates and determinants of BIT signing present
contradictory conclusions: while some scholars have found that BITs have a a sizable and signicant
impact on direct investment inows, others suggest that there is negligible, or no eect at all.
There are a number of studies that report a positive eect of BITs on FDI ows, particularly
for BITs between one developed and one developing country (Salacuse and Sullivan 2009; Buthe
and Milner 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2009). Rose-Ackerman, on the other hand, looks at the
7In the current version of the paper we present an informal discussion of the strategy. Due to data constraints
we were unable to implement it at this stage. We will implement the estimation of the structural model in the next
revision of the paper.
4eect of the global coverage of BITs on investment ows to developing countries: she nds that
the relationship is not linear, with FDI inows increasing at a decreasing marginal rate (Tobin &
Rose-Ackerman 2006; Rose-Ackerman 2009). Egger and Pfafermayer (2004, 2009) nd that the
positive eect on outward FDI stocks from OECD countries of signing a BIT becomes stronger
after the agreement is ratied.
The results seem to vary widely with the sample chosen for the analysis: while an earlier study by
UNCTAD (1998) reports that the number of ratied BITs do not lead to higher inows, Hallward-
Driemeyer (2003; 2009) nds no signicant eects when using data on outows from 20 OECD
countries to 31 developing countries. Yackee (2009) and Tobin & Rose-Ackerman (2005) also nd
little evidence of an eect of BITs on ows. Swenson (2009) and Aisbett (2009) raise endogeneity
and selection concerns. Swenson, for instance, argues that BITs are defensive in nature; they help
foreign aliates already operating in the host. Hence BITs should correlate positively with prior
investment activity; controlling for this he nds a positive association between BITs and investment.
There is also a large controversy on whether BITs complement the eect of a favorable regulatory
environment or act as substitutes for low quality institutions. The ndings in the literature are also
mixed: Rose-Ackerman (2009) and Hallward-Driemeyer (2003) report ndings where BITs seem
to reinforce the eect of domestic institutions, while Neumayer and Spess suggest that investment
agreements substitute for the existence of weak enforcement and low quality institutional practices.
In the end, it is plausible that the contradictory ndings are a function of the sample (country,
sector and temporal coverage), operationalization and transformation of variables (ows, stocks;
dyadic or aggregate), and modeling choices. Yet it is also plausible that the studies are looking
at the wrong functional relationship between BITs and the allocation of FDI that would follow
from their argument. All studies explicitly or implicitly assume that BITs either reinforce the
domestic regulatory environment in favor of foreign investors, or signal that the country is open to
foreign business.8 Yet none of the studies tests the predictions directly and look at FDI ows (or
stocks) instead. While the modeling choice is sensible given data constraints, the threat of omitted
confounders looms large. In the ensuing sections we present a formalization of the argument based
8Buthe and Milner (2009) argue that BITs are a commitment device that locks in the favorable regime oered to
investors.
5on those assumptions that allows us to derive predictions on how signing BITs aects risk and
return. The exercise would also allow us to better derive the expected eect of BITs on the
allocation of FDI which could help reconcile the contradictory results in the empirical literature,
and point to alternative avenues for estimating the eects of BITs on FDI and the activity of MNCs.
3 Modeling BITs
We model the interaction of governments as a network formation process where nodes (countries)
choose which arcs to add (treaties to sign). Following the extant theoretical and empirical literature
on FDI our model assumes that investors prefer higher rates of return, and that investing abroad
involves higher costs and higher risks than investing at home. Hence investors' decisions on how
to allocate their investments should be the outcome of a mean-variance optimization problem.
Governments, in turn, internalize the utility of investors, workers and the expected spillover eects
from inward investment. Governments are in competition for a xed supply of domestic and foreign
investment. 9 We model the main provisions of BITs as an enforcement technology that reduces
costs and risk of investing in a host country. In anarchy arbitration is not a perfect enforcement
mechanism; it constrains host government by creating reputation eects, hence increasing the costs
of opportunistic behavior. These assumptions should be uncontroversial since are explicitly or
implicitly present in the research on this subject.
We start with the description of a model intended to capture how countries allocate their
investment abroad, continue with a presentation of the estimation technique to t the parameters
resulting from actual FDI gures, and conclude with an overview of the network formation game
that makes use of the above.
9Theoretical and empirical models of competition explicitly or implicitly make this assumption. See Elkins et al.
2006; Guzman 2009.
63.1 A Portfolio Optimization Model
First, we discuss the second stage game that determines how countries invest assuming that some
BITs are already signed among them.10
Countries attract capital by oering investment opportunities to investors from other countries.
As with most investments, returns are not guaranteed. They can be represented by random variables
whose statistics depend on the characteristics of the host country and its relationship with the
investor,11 including whether they had signed a BIT or not. We base our model in the hypothesis
that a country seeks to invest its total capital destined to FDIs distributing it among other countries
using a portfolio optimization approach.12
Under this hypothesis, a country forms beliefs about the statistics of returns when investing in
each other country, and optimizes the mean-variance of the return of the portfolio. The portfolio
allocation problem can be solved numerically easily because it can be formulated as a quadratic
optimization problem with linear constraints. To build the model we assume that countries have
an underlying return that depends on the country's development level. Indeed, we let d and g
be the expected returns corresponding to whether the country is developed (d) or developing (g),
respectively, and we let 2
d and 2
g be the corresponding variances. Furthermore, we postulate
that signing a BIT aects these parameters by adding a possibly negative shock on the variance
and a possible positive shock on the return. We denote these shocks by 

d, 

g, 2
d , and 2
g .
Putting all together, a country i that invests in a country j with development level a 2 fd;gg faces
10Later on, we will present a simulation model that uses the framework of this section to study how BITs are
signed.
11As an example, we can represent the investment return by a random variable given by
Ri =
(
Xi with probability 1   pi
 1 with probability pi
where Xi is the random return if things go as planned when investing in country i, and pi is the political risk
that represents a risk of expropriation in which case all the investment is lost. Here, pi will vary depending on
whether the investor and country i have a BIT in eect because of the clauses of the treaty. After some algebra
E(Ri) = E(Xi)   pi(E(Xi) + 1) and V (Ri) = (1   pi)(V (Xi) + pi(E(Xi) + 1)
2).
12In practice, investors may be companies and institutions in the country and not the country itself. Nevertheless,
the heterogeneity among investors makes the outcome of this approach similar to the situation if we had considered
the individual investors.
7stochastic returns whose rst two moments are respectively
a + BITij
a and 2
a + BITij2
a ;
where BITij is a dummy variable that represents whether the two countries have signed a BIT that
is in eect.13
For simplicity of notation, we encode all the statistics of returns in vectors. The resulting
expectations from the point of view of country i are denoted by ~ i, and the variances by ~ 2
i . The
country has to decide what proportion wij of its capital destined to foreign investment is going to
be allocated to country j. We refer to the full vector of allocations for country i as wi.
In summary, denoting the risk-aversion parameter by q  0 (which for now we assume homo-
geneous across countries), country i has to solve the following optimization problem:
maximize ~ T
i wi   1
2 qwT
i wi (1)
subject to ITwi = 1; (2)
0  wi  I: (3)
Here,  is the square covariance matrix and I is the vector of all ones. We make the assumption
that returns are independent for dierent countries, which makes  to be zero o the diagonal and
equal to ~ 2
i along it.14 Since we do not have data for the amount that a country invests in itself,
we decided against including that decision in our model.15
13For tractability reasons, we created the portfolio optimization model in such a way that investment decisions
of one country do generate externalities on other countries. The externalities of signing BITs are captured by the
shocks to the expectations and standard deviations of returns. This simplication allows us to directly optimize
Problem (1)-(3), instead of having had to consider a game to forecast the investment decisions.
14This assumption is not central to the model, but simplies the estimation because we need to estimate a constant
number of parameters instead of a number that depends on the number of countries. Nevertheless, more complicated
models with a constant number of parameters that allow for correlation among returns are also possible.
15Adding domestic investment would have allowed us to incorporate benets to the host country arising from
employment, technological spillovers, tax receipts and other social gains when foreign capital is invested in the
country. The model, though, would not have changed structurally.
83.2 A Simulation Model for BIT Signatures
Using various parameters, which can be estimated as discussed in Section 4.1, a country i that is
considering signing a BIT with country j can forecast the economic benet of going ahead and
signing the treaty. Because at a rst stage we do not model the costs that countries incur when
signing BITs, if the shocks to the expectation and standard deviation turn out to be positive and
negative respectively, it is always benecial to sign a BIT; otherwise, it is never benecial.
Using this framework, we simulate the network formation game where countries are represented
by nodes, and BITs by arcs in the network. It is expected that the equilibrium of this game is that
all BITs are signed between each dyad of countries; the interesting aspect to study are the transient
states leading to equilibrium and compare them to actual BIT data that we have collected.
The modeling decision we need to make is how to select candidates to sign BITs. For a country
chosen at random, one could randomize among those counterpart countries that oer largest welfare
gains if they were to sign a treaty. Since this process is simulated and, hence, has random elements,
we cannot expect the network to look exactly like the one we observe in reality. Instead, we can
look at structural properties of the network and validate that they match. Some examples are
clustering coecient, diameter, and density (Bonomo et al. 2010).16
An central observation from this modeling strategy is that even if BITs are consequential, i.e.,
if they aect the mean or the variance to the return to investment, we would still expect that the
eect of signing a BIT on the allocation of investment across countries will dissipate over time.
This dissipation occurs because as more countries sign more BITs the change they impose to (1),
whichever it is, is made uniform across all countries in the portfolio.17 This is a key insight that
we explore empirically in section 4.
16Bonomo et al. show that a random network growth model of BIT signing oers an excellent t with the observed
evolution of the network. They propose a generalized preferential attachment growth model for the BIT network,
where countries are divided into two groups (developed and developing). At an early stage the likelihood of signing
a BIT with a country is a function of the dierence in the level of development (where developed countries sign
agreements with developing countries) and proportional to the number of BITs signed by that country in prior years.
At a later stage preferential attachment is relaxed and countries are allowed to randomly choose their counterparts.
This simple model of network growth accurately reproduces the evolution of the BIT network (Bonomo et al. 2010,
3666-71).
17Actually, the eect does not disappear completely because the variance term is quadratic and hence does not
sum up to a constant. In addition, there is heterogeneity between the developed and developing countries.
94 Empirics
It is plausible that signing BITs preserves the allocation of investment, or that given the signatory
parties' characteristic signing is defensive, as proposed by Swenson (2009). That does not mean
that BITs have no eect; on the contrary the proliferation of BITs would reduce risk. But risk
cannot be observed directly. In the ensuing sections we present an empirical strategy that aims at
capturing the interaction between governments and investors in the BIT network formation game.
We analyze whether the eect of the allocation of investment as a function of BITs decays over
time, as would be predicted from the model.
In Section 3 we showed that under our model of network formation based on standard portfolio
allocation conditions all dyads would have an incentive to sign those bilateral agreements that
would result in increased returns and reduced risk to investors. This would result in lower risk
levels in all countries participating in the network, and under most circumstances no change in
the allocation of the portfolio of investment. The model assumes that there are no costs or delays
to signing agreements. Yet we know that there are costs to signing agreements, diplomatic and
political, and usually delays in their implementation. Agreements are usually signed and ratied
sequentially. Hence, a host country could see its risk fall when signing and implementing a BIT
with an investment exporting country. This results in a competitive edge over other potential hosts
which leads to a reallocation of investment in its favor. As those competitors sign and implement
investment agreements with the home government reducing their own risk levels, the competitive
edge enjoyed by the rst government would dissipate. Moreover, the increase in investment activity
in the host could lead to higher competition and hence lower net benets, further reducing the
positive eect of BITs over time. In this section we move to test this hypothesis. If this conjecture
is right, we would be able to reconcile the contradictory ndings in the empirical on the eects of
BITs on investment ows.
In order to estimate this hypothesis we collected data of US outward direct investment for the
period 1970-2006. Bilateral direct investment data sources for most countries and year are unreliable
and notoriously spotty. Additionally, estimating the eect of BITs on panels consisting of directed
dyads over time is plagued with technical problems, since the data is usually clustered within
10dyads, within source and host countries and within years. We chose to estimate the relationship
for a unique source country, the US. Limiting our analysis to US outward investment has several
advantages: rst, we are able to validate the data reported by UNCTAD and OECD with the
more reliable data on MNC activity maintained by the BEA.18 Additionally, looking at a unique
source country eliminates one layer of heterogeneity in the data (including dierences in reporting
standards), allowing us to better model the error structure by clustering on the host.19 Tables 1
and 2 present the list of BITs and PTAs, respectively, signed by the US.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The dependent variable in this model is the natural log of the dierence in outward FDI stocks
reported by US MNCs. Given our assumption that the allocation of investment around the world
is analogous to allocating a portolio of capital we chose to investment from a unique source country
rather than ows (from individual or multiple countries) or ratios, the alternative operationalization
of the dependent variable in the empirical literature on the eects of BITs. We adopted a logarithmic
transformation to adjust for the skewed distribution of the FDI.Our empirical strategy is based on
the estimation of the following model:
ln(FDI)i;t = 0 + 1 ln(FDI)i;t 1 + 2 BITij + Xi + t + i + "it ; (4)
where  is a vector of regression coecients, Xi is a vector of k control variables, BITit is an
indicator variable for country/years when a BIT with the US is in eect.20 Some countries do not
need BITs to guarantee investment risk; i is a unit specic disturbance aimed at capturing these
country specic characteristics. More secure investment and better conditions could lead to more
foreign investment over time, which is captured by time controls.21
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3. The controls run in the expected
18We thank Srividya Jandhyala, Vit Henisz and Ed Manseld for sharing the UNCTAD-OECD bilateral FDI data.
We also thank Clint Peinhardt and Todd Allee for sharing their BIT data.
19On the technical issues arising in classical econometric models in the presence of errors clustered by units, dyads
and time see Erikson et al. 2010a, 2010b.
20While entering into a BIT could have legally binding eects on the signatory parties under international law,
these eects tend to be limited particularly in countries that require a legislative approval process of international
agreements. It is only after ratication that the main provisions of investor protection and arbitration would become
eective.
21Errors are clustered on countries. Alternatively we estimate a random eects models.
11direction: countries that are more open to trade, larger, and more developed tend to receive more
US FDI. US MNC activity is greater in countries that are contiguous to the US (Mexico and
Canada) and speak English.22
The second and third columns contain estimates of the eect of years under a ratied BIT. The
coecient on ratied BIT suggests that the eect is sizable and signicant. Yet adding year controls,
in the reported case decade dummies, reduces the eect in substantive and statistical signicance.
Time seems to be doing most of the action: US (and world) outward FDI has increased dramatically
since the 1980s; this coincides with the start of the US BIT signing activity. Moreover, UNCTAD
reports that more countries have adopted pro-investor regulatory policies in the same period, raising
concerns of spurious correlation. Indeed, looking at the world as a whole, Figure 1 shows a peak
in the number of signatures of new BITs in the late 1990s and the whole curve resembles closely
that of average FDI activity in the world. This pattern is apparent in Figures 3 and 4 that plots
the US outward FDI stock to countries in the Upper-middle and Lower-middle income groups, and
the cumulative number of BITs signed.23 It is not clear which is a consequence of each other or
whether the two are a consequence of yet another variable, as for example economic activity in the
world, that could aect both of these variables.
Figure 1 about here
Adding temporal dummies reduces the size and signicance level of BITs on outward US in-
vestment. These results are similar to those reported in the literature. Note, however, that the
coecient captures the average estimated eect for all country/years under a ratied BITs. It is
plausible that the eect dissipates once other actors internalize the incentives created by the signing
and ratication of the BIT by a dyad. In order to estimate these temporal eects we t additional
models identifying four-, ve- and ten-year intervals since the BIT is in eect.24 The results suggest
22Note that in the random eects models, and in OLS models with errors corrected for panel eects, distance
enters with a positive sign and never reaches conventional signicance level. We are able to retrieve a negative and
signicant coecient on distance, as would be expected in the gravity setup, when other controls are removed from
the model. Contiguity and language remain signicant after controlling for PTAs.
23The US has signed most BITs with countries in these two income groups. Similar patterns are observe for the
other two income groups as classied by the World Bank: High and Low.
24Using a year count interacted with the year under a ratied BIT we obtain the following results: year enters
positively, which captures the increase in FDI since the mid-1980s. The coecient on the ratied BIT dummy is
12that the eect of BIT ratication on US investment ows is stronger in the intervals closest to the
agreement's entry in eect, and the eect dissipates over time.25
[Table 3 about here]
In sum, the evidence from the statistical analysis suggests that the eect of BITs is not stable,
as would be predicted by the portfolio allocation model of the network formation game introduced
in Section 3. Yet given the properties of the investment regimes we would need to explore the
eect BITs on the return to investment or the risk faced by investors, two outcomes that are very
dicult to observe when dealing with investment under control. We could explore the rst eect
by regressing a coarse proxy of return -namely the income reported by the aliates of US MNCs
over the stock invested in that country- on the existence of a BIT in the country of the aliate,
and other controls.26 We also test whether being under a ratied BIT has any eect on risk, by
regressing an index of investment risk, on a dummy variable that measures the existence of a ratied
BIT.27
[Tables 4 and 5 about here]
Tables 4 and 5 reproduce the results from this exercise. The tables show that there is no
positive association between country-years under BITs and the return to investment.28 Yet the
positive and signicant, and the interaction term between BIT and time enters the regression negatively, in line with
the ndings reported in table 3. These models are available from the authors upon request.
25In additional models we analyze the eect of PTAs signed by the US which include investment protection
chapters similar to those in the US model BIT. Being under a PTA has a positive eect on US investment under
some specications but not others; yet the addition of these variables to the econometric models does not aect the
estimated eect of a ratied BIT in substantive or statistical terms. The US has signed preferential trade agreements
with the following countries: Canada and Mexico (NAFTA, in eect since 1994); Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
El Salvador, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR, signed in 2004, with eective dates that vary for
each party depending on their ratication); Peru (2006, in eect since 2009); Chile (2003, ratied in 2004); Morocco
(signed in 2004, ratied in 2006); Oman (signed in 2006; ratied in 2009); Singapore (signed in 2003; ratied in 2004);
and Australia (signed in 2004; ratied in 2005). The following PTAs have not entered into eect as on August 2010:
Colombia (signed in 2006); Panama (signed in 2007); and South Korea (signed in 2007). The US has also entered
into PTAs with no investment protection with three Middle Eastern countries: Jordan (signed in 2000, in eect
since 2001); Israel (signed in 1985 and ratied in 1995); and Bahrain (signed in 2004 and ratied in 2006; contains
protection provisions for nancial invest only). See Table 2
26The income data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, Direct Investment
Income Without Current-Cost Adjustment. Income is presented net of U.S. and foreign withholding taxes.
27The risk index is the investment component of the International Country Risk Guide. Its subcomponents include:
i) Contract Viability/Expropriation; ii) Prots Repatriation; and iii) Payment Delays. Higher values are associate
with lower risk.
28Note, however, that the income reported active aliates of US MNCs is far from the best proxy of the underlying
return concept on which our model is based. Moreover, there is an built-in selection bias since the reported income
is only for aliates which are already conducting business in the host country. The pattern of missing values in the
BEA income data is not random given the suppression of data to avoid disclosure of individual companies.
13results reproduced in Table 5 do suggest that ratied BITs are positive and statistically signicant
associate with a more favorable investment environment in host countries. The within unit xed
eect specication suggests that countries that sign and ratify a BIT with the US have lower
investment risk. But just like the association between BITs and ows, we nd the the relationship
is stronger in the rst decade after the BIT has been ratied and is in eect. Altogether the results
suggest that BITs have a temporary eect on the allocation of investment, and that the eect
is likely to be driven by a reduction in the risk environment faced by investors in the host, but
not on the expected returns in those countries. It should be noted, however, that the aggregate
measure of risk does not exactly match the concept on which our model is built which should
be bilateral, and hence harder to observe. In the next section we present an empirical strategy
aimed to estimating directly the eect of BITs on risk that would be predicted from the model.
The structural estimation allows us to retrieve the underlying variance on the return to investment
from the observed pattern of allocation of the home country investment portfolio once we xed the
expected return to that investment.
4.1 Parameter Estimation using the Portfolio Model
In the portfolio model of Section 3.1, we do not explicitly model the process by which countries
acquire their beliefs on the statistics of returns to investments from other home countries in other
home countries, recognizing that they are extremely hard to obtain. Instead, we will make use of
the FDI data to develop a structural estimation model that can be used to nd estimates for the
expectation and variance of returns. To achieve that goal, we collected a database of bilateral FDI
for all countries available in the period 1970-2006 and all the existing BITs with the dates when
they were signed and ratied. This database includes the stock of capital that a country i has
invested in each other country. Using that data, we computed vectors wt
i that measure investments
as a fraction of the total capital for country i in year t.
Since we have assumed that countries allocate money using the portfolio approach described
in Section 3.1, we can use the observed data to construct an estimator for the statistics of returns
between countries. To do so, we compare the observed fractions to the fractions derived from
14Problem (1)-(3). Referring to an optimal solution to that problem by
w(BITst;d;g;2
d;2
g;

d;
g;2
d ;2
g ;q);
we can t the parameters by minimizing the sum of the squares of the Euclidean distance between
the observed and predicted vectors:29
X
i;t
jjwt
i   w(BITst;d;g;2
d;2
g;

d;
g;2
d ;2
g ;q)jj2
2 :
Notice that this goodness-of-t function cannot detect the value of q from the various values cor-
responding to variances because both are multiplied together for all countries. Nevertheless, since
all variances are multiplied by the same constant, our estimates are enough to draw conclusions on
the relative changes between the dierent variances in the presence or absence of BITs.
To develop a test for the estimators we proposed, we perform Monte Carlo simulation to generate
random data and evaluate their statistical properties. We consider an incumbent country and for a
set of countries and a range of years, we randomly sign BITs between the incumbent and the other
countries. Furthermore, we also assign those countries to the developed or developing world. With
that structure of a world, we set the `real' expectation and variance of returns to be
E(R
y
i) = e
0 + e
BITBIT
y
i + e
DEVDEVi;
and
V (R
y
i) = v
0 + v
BITBIT
y
i + v
DEVDEVi;
where R
y
i is the return of the incumbent country investing in country i in year y, BIT
y
i is the
indicator variable that country i signed a BIT at that time and DEVi represents if the country is
developed.
29This is a modeling decision, we could have done the same with the FDI values instead of the corresponding
fractions. In that case, the model would have given more weight to countries with more capital and dyads with larger
investment.
15Our approach consists in setting values for the betas, generating data consistent with those
values, constructing estimates for the betas, and nally comparing the estimates to the `real' values
chosen rst. To generate the sample, we take the expectation and variance of returns for each year,
perturb them by adding Gaussian errors with a xed variance, and nd the optimal investments
of the incumbent in the other countries for each year using the portfolio optimization approach
described previously. This process gives us a sample of portfolios (p
y
i)i;y where
P
i p
y
i = 1 that
represent the `observed' FDIs invested by the incumbent country in each of the other countries.
For each sample, we use the perturbed expectation and the observed portfolio to compute the
values of ^ v
0, ^ v
BIT, and ^ v
DEV using least squares. For instance, for each possible triplet of betas, we
compute the corresponding portfolio allocation and evaluate the distance to the observed portfolio.
Minimizing that objective function provides us with the estimators. We repeat this process for
each of the generated samples to understand the statistics of the estimators. We ran simulations
for various random experiments (dierent congurations of the world and dierent `real' values for
the betas) and found that the empirical expectations of the estimators agree with the values from
where we started (see gure 6). All the empirical distributions seem reasonably normal, although
some of them are slightly skewed.30
The previous simulations give us some condence that if present in the data we should be able
to retrieve the underlying risk level faced by US investors when a BIT is present and when it is
not. Thus, in order to estimate whether the eect of BITs on risk runs in the direction expected
by our model we t the least squares estimator to the data: we have information on the observed
portfolio allocation each year, the observed return (proxied by income), the level of development
of the host country, and the presence of a ratied BIT in that country.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a network formation game aimed at explaining the signing of BITs. The
model incorporates the key insights from the theoretical and empirical literature on the proliferation
30We are still investigating the reasons of this. A possibility is that it has to do with the fact that variances can
never be smaller than zero.
16of international investment agreements. In particular we assume that investors' decisions to be
active abroad are driven by the expectation of receiving greater returns. Given the nature of
FDI, the decision is also aected by risk levels in host countries. We explicitly model the main
provisions of BITs as an enforcement technology that reduces (but does not eliminate) risk (the
variance to investors' return), and has the potential to increase the expected return from doing
business abroad. The interaction between governments is modeled as a network formation process
where nodes (countries) choose which arcs to add (treaties to sign). In deciding which treaties
to sign, governments also internalize the potential eects of inward investment on the return to
domestic factors of production.
This setup allows us to derive a central corollary that helps explain the contradictory ndings
in the empirical literature on eect of BITs on investment ows (and even stocks). Signing and
ratifying BITs is likely to increase the mean and reduce the variance of the return to investors
from the counterpart in the agreement. It does not necessarily follow that the growth would result
in a sharp and permanent reallocation of investment in the world. In equilibrium -when all the
potentially benecial agreements have been signed and the network reaches a level of saturation-
the signing and ratication of BITs would be consistent with hardly any reallocation of investment
capital across countries, particularly if BIT signing is defensive as proposed by a body of the
literature. We would, however, expect some transitional changes in the allocation of capital in
favor of countries that are BIT signatories in the transition to that stage, a prediction that seems
to be borne out in statistical analyses of US outward FDI ows. We do expect BITs to have an
eect on risk and return to foreign investors, which are hard to observe. Hence we develop an
empirical strategy to estimate the eect of BITs on investment risk from a structural model of FDI
allocation.
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Figure 1: New treaties per year. The insets show cumulative numbers. Source: Bonomo et al.
2010.
18Figure 2: United States: Total BITs and FDI outward stock into High income countries
Figure 3: United States: Total BITs signed and mean FDI outward stock into Upper-middle income
countries
19Figure 4: United States: Total BITs signed and mean FDI outward stock into Lower-middle income
countries
Figure 5: United States: Total BITs and FDI outward stock into Low income countries
20Figure 6: Distribution of errors of simulated parameters from Monte Carlo experiment
True Expect St. dev
+15.00 +14.783 +0.477
-3.00 -3.067 +0.528
+2.00 +2.034 +0.564
n=8, t=21, sample=10,000
Eucl. dist.=0.229496
21Table 1: BITs signed by the US
Country Sign Date Entry Date
Panama Oct-1982 May-1991
Senegal Dec-1983 Oct-1990
Haiti Dec-1983 ..
Congo Dem Aug-1984 Jul-1989
Morocco Jul-1985 May-1991
Turkey Dec-1985 May-1990
Cameroon Feb-1986 Apr-1989
Bangladesh Mar-1986 Jul-1989
Egypt Mar-1986 Jun-1992
Grenada May-1986 Mar-1989
Congo Feb-1990 Aug-1994
Poland Mar-1990 Aug-1994
Tunisia May-1990 Feb-1993
Sri Lanka Sep-1991 May-1993
Czech Republic Oct-1991 Dec-1992
Slovakia Oct-1991 Dec-1992
Argentina Nov-1991 Oct-1994
Kazakhstan May-1992 Jan-1994
Romania May-1992 Jan-1994
Russian Federation Jun-1992 ..
Bulgaria Sep-1992 Jun-1994
Armenia Sep-1992 Mar-1996
Kyrgyzstan Jan-1993 Jan-1994
Moldova Apr-1993 Nov-1994
Ecuador Aug-1993 May-1997
Belarus Jan-1994 ..
Jamaica Feb-1994 Mar-1997
Ukraine Mar-1994 Nov-1996
Georgia Mar-1994 Aug-1997
Estonia Apr-1994 Feb-1997
Trinidad & Tobago Sep-1994 Dec-1996
Mongolia Oct-1994 Jan-1997
Uzbekistan Dec-1994 ..
Latvia Jan-1995 Dec-1996
Albania Jan-1995 Jan-1998
Honduras Jul-1995 Jul-2001
Nicaragua Jul-1995 ..
Croatia Jul-1996 Jun-2001
Jordan Jul-1997 Jun-2003
Azerbaijan Aug-1997 Aug-2001
Lithuania Jan-1998 Nov-2001
Bolivia Apr-1998 Jun-2001
Mozambique Dec-1998 Mar-2005
El Salvador Mar-1999 ..
Bahrain Sep-1999 May-2001
Uruguay Nov-2005 Nov-2006
Rwanda Feb-2008 ..Table 2: PTAs signed by the US
Partner country Sign date Entry date Type of PTA Investment
protection
Israel Apr-1985 Jan-1995 Bilateral No
Canada Dec-1993 Jan-1994 NAFTA Yes
Mexico Dec-1993 Jan-1994 NAFTA Yes
Jordan Oct-2000 Dec-2001 Bilateral No
Singapore May-2003 Jan-2004 Bilateral Yes
Chile Jun-2003 Jan-2004 Bilateral Yes
Australia May-2004 Jan-2005 Bilateral Yes
El Salvador May-2004 Mar-2006 CAFTA-DR Yes
Honduras May-2004 Apr-2006 CAFTA-DR Yes
Nicaragua May-2004 Apr-2006 CAFTA-DR Yes
Guatemala May-2004 Jul-2006 CAFTA-DR Yes
Dominican Republic May-2004 Mar-2007 CAFTA-DR Yes
Costa Rica May-2004 Jan-2009 CAFTA-DR Yes
Morocco Jun-2004 Jan-2006 Bilateral Yes
Bahrain Sep-2004 Aug-2006 Bilateral Yesy
Oman Jan-2006 Jan-2009 Bilateral Yes
Peru Apr-2006 Feb-2009 Bilateral Yes
Colombia Nov-2006 .. Bilateral Yes
Panama Jun-2007 .. Bilateral Yes
South Korea Jun-2007 .. Bilateral Yes
y Protection for nancial investment onlyTable 3: Eect of ratied BITs on US outward investment
Dependent Variable
Variable Ln (US FDI outows)
Ln(FDI)t 1 0.746 0.542 0.627 0.541 0.628 0.541 0.628
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Interval under ratied BIT
All years 1.06 0.454
(0.213) (0.241)
1st interval 0.22 0.242 0.299 0.307 0.397
(0.256) (0.314) (0.257) (0.308) (0.188)
2nd interval 0.685 0.838 0.479 0.619 0.046
(0.282) (0.318) (0.274) (0.316) (0.316)
3rd interval 0.017 0.377 0.371 0.584
(0.360) (0.307) (0.220) (0.272)
4th interval 0.377 1.008 -0.266 0.058
(0.738) (0.530) (0.790) (0.671)
5th interval 0.245 0.806
(1.039) (0.828)
Ln(GDP/cap) 0.646 0.464 0.646 0.465 0.648 0.464
(0.264) (0.101) (0.265) (0.101) (0.265) (0.101)
Ln(openness) 0.621 0.438 0.617 0.437 0.618 0.439
(0.189) (0.093) (0.190) (0.093) (0.190) (0.093)
Ln(xrate) -0.018 -0.014 -0.019 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013
(0.028) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.028) (0.012)
Ln(population) -0.206 0.45 -0.198 0.45 -0.192 0.451
(0.469) (0.044) (0.472) (0.044) (0.472) (0.044)
Contiguous 0.839 0.829 0.826
(0.504) (0.502) (0.501)
Common language 0.241 0.24 0.238
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128)
Ln(distance) 0.193 0.189 0.19
(0.217) (0.217) (0.216)
Income group (excl: High)
Low -0.834 -0.84 -0.843
(0.276) (0.276) (0.276)
Lower-middle -0.793 -0.794 -0.799
(0.219) (0.219) (0.219)
Upper-middle -0.604 -0.608 -0.61
(0.194) (0.194) (0.194)
Decades (excl: 1970s)
1980s 2.236 1.82 2.238 1.818 2.236 1.817
(0.167) (0.151) (0.168) (0.151) (0.168) (0.151)
1990s 2.903 2.121 2.909 2.116 2.906 2.112
(0.290) (0.200) (0.291) (0.200) (0.291) (0.199)
2000s 2.966 2.076 2.956 2.075 2.959 2.08
(0.332) (0.223) (0.332) (0.223) (0.332) (0.223)
Intercept 0.037 -8.231 -11.953 -8.287 -11.931 -8.349 -11.928
(0.049) (4.644) (1.897) (4.658) (1.896) (4.657) (1.895)
N 3658 3499 3499 3499 3499 3499 3499
Groups 188 178 178 178 178 178 178
R2 0.702 0.649 0.752 0.652 0.752 0.653 0.752
Intercepts FE FE Random FE Random FE Random
Region dummies No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Under BIT interval All All 5-year 5-year 4-year 4-year 10-year
Signicance levels :  10%  5%  1%; clustered std. errors in parenthesis.Table 4: Eect of ratied BITs on Income
Variable DV: Return = Income/FDI Position
Returnt 1 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(0.064) (0.063) (0.067) (0.061) (0.065)
Ln(FDI)t 1 0.007 0.01 0.008 0.011 0.009
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Interval under ratied BIT
BIT ratied -0.109 -0.089 -0.006
(0.083) (0.078) (0.079)
Under BIT (1st) -0.126 -0.064
(0.084) (0.065)
Under BIT (2nd) 0.252 0.322
(0.283) (0.321)
Ln(GDP/cap) 0.114 0.099 0.115 0.098
(0.102) (0.062) (0.102) (0.063)
Ln(openness) -0.039 -0.071 -0.046 -0.076
(0.069) (0.049) (0.069) (0.051)
Ln(xrate) -0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Ln(population) -0.015 -0.02 -0.021 -0.022
(0.161) (0.020) (0.157) (0.021)
Ln(distance) -0.056 -0.069
(0.092) (0.095)
Decades (excl: 2000s)
1980s 0.057 0.051 0.074 0.068
(0.055) (0.037) (0.065) (0.047)
1990s 0.055 0.051 0.085 0.081
(0.031) (0.025) (0.052) (0.046)
Income group (excl: High)
Low 0.101 0.107
(0.151) (0.155)
Lower-middle 0.078 0.073
(0.227) (0.230)
Upper-middle 0.04 0.037
(0.091) (0.093)
Intercept 0.143 -0.641 0.117 -0.586 0.239
(0.052) (1.680) (0.653) (1.628) (0.690)
N 1497 1485 1485 1485 1485
Groups 144 142 142 142 142
R2 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.0029 0.046
Intercepts FE FE RE FE RE
Region dummies No No Yes No Yes
Under BIT interval All All All 10-year 10-year
Signicance levels :  10%  5%  1%; clustered std. errors in parenthesis.Table 5: Eect of ratied BITs on Investment Risk
Variable DV: Investment risk
Investment Riskt 1 -0.131 -0.241 -0.242 -0.242
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Interval under ratied BIT
BIT ratied 0.543 0.263
(0.107) (0.134)
Under BIT (1st) 0.296 0.268
(0.138) (0.153)
Under BIT (2nd) 0.021 0.342
(0.142) (0.158)
Under BIT (3rd) 0.02
(0.148)
Under BIT (4th) 0.172
(0.166)
Ln(GDP/cap) 0.563 0.558 0.557
(0.211) (0.211) (0.211)
Ln(openness) 0.439 0.446 0.445
(0.114) (0.115) (0.115)
Ln(xrate) 0 0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ln(population) 0.913 0.92 0.92
(0.291) (0.290) (0.291)
Decades (excl: 2000s)
1980s -0.421 -0.432 -0.431
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
1990s -0.339 -0.357 -0.355
(0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
Intercept 0.939 -13.16 -13.202 -13.19
(0.068) (3.540) (3.539) (3.539)
N 2687 2630 2630 2630
Groups 141 137 137 137
R2 0.0254 0.0077 0.0079 0.0079
Intercepts FE FE FE FE
Under BIT interval All All 10-year 5-year
Signicance levels :  10%  5%  1%; clustered std. errors in parenthesis.References
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